As shown by the recent turmoil in credit markets, much remains to be done for the proper risk management of credit derivatives. In particular, the static copula-based models commonly used for pricing portfolio credit derivatives appear to be inappropriate for hedging and risk management. We study hedging of index CDO tranches with the underlying index default swap using various portfolio loss models which account for default contagion and spread risk. Numerical results obtained from models calibrated to iTraxx Europe data reveal significant differences in hedge ratios across models and show, unlike what had been previously suggested in the literature by comparing copula-based models, that hedging strategies are subject to substantial model risk. An empirical analysis based on recent market data shows that strategies based on delta-hedging of spread movements have poorly performed during the 2007-2008 subprime crisis, while variance-minimizing hedges led to significantly smaller losses. Our empirical study also reveals that, while sudden large moves do occur in index spreads, these jumps do not necessarily occur on default dates of index constituents, an observation which contradicts the intuition conveyed by some recently proposed credit risk models.
Introduction
Static factor models, in particular the Gaussian Copula model [17] , have been widely used for hedging portfolio credit derivatives such as collateralized debt obligations (CDOs). The risk of a CDO tranche has been often characterized in terms of sensitivities to shifts in risk factors in a copula-based framework [21] . Accordingly, hedging practices have been typically based on such measure of sensitivity. The most common hedging approach has been to "delta-hedge" the changes due to spread fluctuations using credit default swaps (CDSs).
However, the recent turmoil in credit derivatives markets shows that these commonly used hedging approaches are inefficient. One of the main problems has been the lack of well-defined dynamics for risk factors in such static model, which prevents any model-based assessment of hedging strategies. In particular, delta-hedging of spread risk is loosely justified using a Black-Scholes analogy which does not necessarily hold and the corresponding hedge ratios, the spread-deltas, are in fact computed from a static model without spread risk. Furthermore, delta-hedging of spread risk ignores default risk and jumps in the spreads which appeared to be critical for risk management during the difficult market environment in 2008. Although gamma hedging (hedging of small movements in spread-delta) can improve the performance slightly, it is not sufficient to solve these issues.
Realizing the deficiencies of copula-based hedging methods, alternatives have been proposed to tackle the problem of hedging portfolio credit derivatives. Durand and Jouanin [8] describe hedging practices for credit derivatives and provide an approximation of the P&L of a portfolio hedged with misspecified parameters under the real-world probability measure. They correctly point out the inconsistency between most of the pricing models, where the risk is occurrence of defaults, and the real hedging strategy, where the trader will protect his portfolio against small CDS spreads movements. Bielecki, Jeanblanc and Rutkowski [2] show that, in a bottom-up hazard process framework driven by a Brownian motion, perfect replication is possible by continuous trading in a sufficient number of liquidly traded CDS contracts. However, these strategies are not tested on real data to assess their actual performance. Laurent, Cousin and Fermanian [16] study hedging of synthetic CDO with the underlying index default swap in a Markovian contagion framework without spread risk. They show that the market is complete in their framework and CDO payoffs can be replicated by a self-financing portfolio consists of the index default swap and a risk-free bond. As we will see in Section 5, spread movements are a major source of risk even there in absence of defaults in the underlying portfolio so failure to incorporate spread risk in their model can be a major disadvantage. Moreover, the numerical results in [16] are not obtained from models calibrated to the market data which lead to inconclusive comparisons.
Frey and Backhaus [10] take a more realistic approach which acknowledges market incompleteness when both spread risk and default contagion are taken into account. They observe significant differences between the sensitivity-based hedging strategies computed in the Gaussian Copula framework and the dynamic hedging strategies derived in their setup. Besides the analysis of sensitivity-based hedging, they show that variance-minimization provides a model-based endogenous interpolation between the hedging against spread risk and default risk.
The hedging methods in these studies approach the problem from different, often incompatible standpoints and and a systematic comparison of the resulting hedge ratios and the subsequent hedging performance has not been done in a realistic setting with market data. Needless to say, in order for such a comparison to be meaningful the models need to be calibrated to the same data set. The very feasibility of this calibration is a serious (computational) constraint which excludes many models discussed in the literature, leading us to focus on the class of top-down models [1, 5, 12, 13, 15, 19, 22, 23] .
Motivated by previous studies indicating the impact of model uncertainty on the pricing and hedging derivative instruments [4] , our objective is to study the hedging of index CDO tranches with the underlying index default swaps derived under various model assumptions. For various models in this class, we will compare different dynamic hedging strategies in terms of their hedge ratios and backtesting performances. Strategies under investigation include delta-hedging of spread risk, hedging of default risk and variance minimization (quadratic hedging).
This article is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the cash-flow structure of an index default swap and synthetic CDO, and presents a brief overview of the top-down modeling approach for portfolio credit derivatives. Section 3 introduces the top-down credit models under consideration and their calibrated parameters to iTraxx Europe data. In Section 4, we study three dynamic hedging strategies, delta-hedging of spread risk, hedging of default risk and variance-minimization, in terms of their hedge ratios and properties. In Section 5, we compare the performance of different strategies for the hedging of various iTraxx CDO tranches and the impact of defaults on the CDX North America indices in the 2006-2008 period. Section 6 concludes.
Portfolio credit derivatives
A portfolio credit derivative is a contingent claim whose payoff is a function of the aggregate default loss of a given portfolio of obligors (debt instruments). The main object of interest is the aggregate loss due to defaults in such a portfolio. Consider an equally weighted portfolio (index) of n obligors and assuming for simplicity a constant recovery rate R (typically assumed to be 40%), the portfolio loss (in fraction of total notional values) at date t is simply equal to
where N t is the number of defaults by time t. The portfolio loss L t is modeled as a stochastic process on a (filtered) probability space (Ω, F, {F t } t≥0 , Q) where Ω is the set of market scenarios, {F t } t≥0 represents the flow of information, and Q is a probability measure representing the market pricing rule. Two important examples of portfolio credit derivatives are index default swaps (CDS index) and collateralized debt obligations (CDOs).
Index default swaps
Index default swaps are now commonly traded on various credit indices such as iTraxx and CDX series which are equally weighted indices of CDSs. In an index default swap transaction, a protection seller agrees to pay all default losses in the index (default leg) in return for a fixed periodic spreads s index (0) paid on the total notional of obligors remaining in the index (premium leg). Let 0 < t 1 < ... < t J be the payment dates where t J = T is the maturity date of the contract. On a payment date t j , the protection seller pays the portfolio loss L t j − L t j−1 incurred in (t j−1 , t j ]. In return, he receives a "spread" payment on the remaining notional which is equal to
The value of the default leg at time t is equal to:
Similarly, the value of the premium leg at time t is given by:
The index default swap "fair" spread at time t, s index (t), which is quoted in the market, is defined as the value of the spread which sets the two legs equal:
The mark-to-market value of a protection seller's position at time t ≥ 0 is equal to the difference between the two legs:
which can also be expressed as
where
is the duration of the index default swap at time t. For simplicity, we will always refer mark-to-market value as the value of the protection seller's position.
Collateralized debt obligations
Consider a tranche defined by an interval [a, b] , 0 ≤ a < b ≤ 1, for the portfolio loss normalized by the total notional. We call a and b the attachment and detachment point of the tranche respectively. A synthetic CDO tranche swap is a bilateral contract in which the protection seller agrees to pay all portfolio loss within the interval [a, b] (default leg) in return for a periodic spread s [a,b] (0) on the remaining tranche notional (premium leg). On any payment date t j , the protection seller pays the tranche loss incurred in (t j−1 , t j ] which is equal to
+ is the loss of tranche [a, b] at time t. In return, he receives a payment on the remaining tranche notional which is equal to
The value of the default leg (normalized by the total tranche notional value) at time t is equal to the expected tranche loss under Q:
and the value of the premium leg is equal to the expected premium payments under Q:
The "fair" tranche spread at time t, s [a,b] (t), which is usually quoted in the market, is defined as the spread which sets the two legs equal:
The mark-to-market value of a protection seller's position (normalized by the total tranche notional value), or simply the mark-to-market value, at time t is equal to the difference between two legs:
where 3 Top-down models for portfolio credit derivatives
Given that portfolio credit derivatives are contingent claims on the portfolio loss, to price such derivatives one can directly model the evolution of the aggregate portfolio loss process L: this approach is known as the top-down approach to portfolio credit risk. Examples of this modeling approach include [1, 3, 6, 5, 9, 12, 13, 14, 15, 19, 22, 23] . As we have mentioned in Section 1, the main advantage of the top-down approach is its flexible dynamic modeling framework in which one can meaningfully speak about hedging, and is also amenable to calibration to market data. Assume that the point process L, or equivalently N , admits an intensity λ with respect to the filtration F, i.e.
The intensity λ is known as the portfolio default intensity. Intuitively speaking, λ t can be seen as the probability per unit time of the next default conditional on the current market information:
where F t represents all the information resulting from the observations of the loss process and all the risk factors affecting it up to time t. Top-down models in the literature differ in their specifications for the portfolio default intensity. For example, the portfolio default intensity can be modeled as a function of time and the portfolio loss process L itself which is considered in [1, 5, 6, 15] . We denote this class of models "local intensity models" by analogy to local volatility models used in equity derivative pricing. In a local intensity model, the market is complete [16] and we can construct a self-financing portfolio to replicate the payoff of CDOs with the underlying index default swap and a risk-free bond.
Other examples of top-down models include the Compound Poisson model [3] , self-exciting models [9, 12, 13, 14] , two-dimensional Markovian spread/default models [1, 19] and dynamic forward intensity models [22, 23] . We will consider four models in this class: the homogeneous Gaussian Copula model (Gauss) [17] , a local intensity model [15] , the bivariate spread-loss model (BSLP) [1] and a Compound Poisson model [3] . Table 1 shows the calibrated spreads of each model correspond to the 5-year iTraxx Europe investment grade (IG) Series 6 data on 20 September 2006 and Series 8 data on 20 September 2007. We calibrate each model by minimizing the sum of the squared percentage error of the index and tranche spreads. As we can see, all models are amenable to calibration to market data. This is a minimal requirement for comparisons of hedging strategies across models.
Homogeneous Gaussian Copula model
The homogeneous Gaussian Copula model is a one-factor Gaussian Copula model [17] in which all entities have the same constant individual default intensity. Base-correlation methodology [18] for calibration, and we denote ρ(t) as the set of base correlations calibrated to the market spreads at time t. Figure 1 shows the base correlations calibrated to the iTraxx data. Throughout this paper, we will consider the set of base correlations ρ(t) together with the CDS index spreads s index (t) as the full set of market data at time t. 
Local intensity model
We consider the parametric model introduced by Herbertsson [15] in which
where b 0 , ..., b n are constants. The interpretation of (5) is that the portfolio default intensity jumps by an amount b k when the k th default happens. There is no sign restriction on b k as long as the portfolio default intensity λ remains positive. As in [15] we parametrize b k as
where 1, µ 1 , ..., µ I is a partition of {1, ..., n} which is typically related to the attachment points of the tranches. This gives us the same number of unknown parameters as number of available market spreads. Figure 2 shows the dependence of the (log of) calibrated portfolio default intensity (5) on number of defaults 2 . Observe that the portfolio default intensity stays at a low level until a sharp jump at N = 25, which is the attachment point of tranche [12%, 22%]. 
Bivariate spread-loss model
Arnsdorff and Halperin [1] specify the portfolio default intensity using a two factor model
F (t, N ) is a function of time t and number of defaults N . The second factor Y generates spread volatility between default dates and follows
where W is a standard Brownian motion under Q. Following the approach suggested by Arnsdorf and Halperin in [1] , we fix the parameters (a, b, σ) and calibrate F (t, N ) to market data which is assumed to be time-homogeneous and piecewise linear in N between the attachment-detachment points of the tranches. Figure 3 shows the (log of) calibrated contagion factors F (t, N ) by assuming Y (0) = 1. Since Y is not observable, we need to either fix its value at initial time t arbitrarily or calibrate it to the market data. In the later case, we write the calibrated value of Y t as a function of the market data in the form
If Y ≡ 1 almost surely, the model reduces to the local intensity model discussed above. 
Compound Poisson model
Brigo, Pallavicini and Torresetti [3] model N as a Compound Poisson process stopped at n:
where M i , i = 1, ..., I are independent Poisson processes with constant intensity η i , and α i ∈ {1, ..., n}, i = 1, ..., I. When a jump occurs in M i , it corresponds to α i number of defaults to occur simultaneously. This modeling feature is different from the local intensity model and bivariate spread-loss model which only allow one default to occur at each time. Table 2 shows the values of (α i , η i ) calibrated to iTraxx data. 
Hedging strategies
We will now investigate different dynamic hedging strategies for CDO tranches derived in the model settings of the previous section. In particular, we will consider delta-hedging of spread risk, hedging of default risk and variance-minimization. As we will see, most of the hedge ratios are given in terms of the mark-to-market values of the index default swap and CDO tranches. Let us first introduce the mark-to-market value functions which will be useful when we introduce the hedge ratios.
Definition 1.
Assume that F is generated by Y and N . Let Q be a risk-neutral probability measure associated with a set of model parameters p. From (2) and (4) 
Then, from (1) and (3), we define the mark-to-market value functions as:
If there is no risk factor Y in the model, we omit the corresponding arguments in the functions.
Since the mark-to-market values in (1) and (3) are normalized by the notional values, the hedge ratios presented in the following sections will also be expressed in terms of notional values, i.e. if the hedge ratio is equal to ∆ at time t, we hedge a protection seller's position in the tranche with 1 Euro notional value by entering a protection buyer's position at time t in the index default swap with ∆ Euro notional value. In the rest of this paper, we denote p as the set of model parameters. If it is calibrated to market data at time t, we simply write it as a function of the index spread and the base correlations:
Delta-hedging of spread risk
In practice, the most common approach for hedging CDOs has been to hedge the risk of changing in spreads for a particular reference entity with credit default swaps [21, 8] . Similarly, one can hedge against fluctuations in the index spread, which is equivalent to a parallel shift in the CDS spreads of all reference entities, with the index default swap. We denote the corresponding hedge ratio as the (index) spread-delta.
Definition 2. For small > 0, the spread-delta for tranche [a, b] at time t is defined as
Note that the spread-delta is computed by recalibrating the model to the perturbed index spread, then taking the ratio of the change in tranche value to the change in the index default swap value. This is not equivalent to the partial derivative of the model price with respect to the spread. Figure 4 shows the numerical values of the spread-deltas. Notice that calibration to a common set of market data leads to similar spread-deltas across models. This observation implies that there seems to be no point in using sophisticated models if the hedging is simply based on spread-deltas.
Remark 2. Another possible strategy for hedging spread risk is sensitivity-based hedging with respect to changes in the risk factor Y of the bivariate spread-loss model. The corresponding hedge ratio is given by
for small > 0. This hedge ratio is essentially the ratio of partial derivatives with respect to the initial value of the risk factor Y . However, this strategy is model-specific and we are not able to compare it across models. We will study its empirical performance in Section 5. 
Hedging of default risk
As delta-hedging of spread risk does not take default risk into account, one may take positions in the index default swap based on the jump-to-default ratio to offset the changes in tranche values when defaults occur. The top-down framework focuses on the next-to-default rather than the default of a specific name. Therefore we only have one jump-to-default ratio to consider:
Definition 3. Let p and Y t be the set of model parameters and risk factor calibrated to the market data at time t respectively. Then jump-to-default ratio at time t is defined as
Figure 5 compares the jump-to-default ratios across models. Unlike the case of spread-delta, we immediately see that the jump-to-default ratios are significantly different across models. Comparing to the homogeneous Gaussian Copula model, jump-to-default ratios of the local intensity model and the bivariate spread-loss model appear to be generally smaller for the equity tranche and larger for non-equity tranches. On the other hand, the observation is opposite for the Compound Poisson model which gives larger jump-to-default ratios than those of the homogeneous Gaussian Copula model for the equity tranche, and smaller for non-equity tranches. These results show that, unlike what had been previously suggested in the literature by comparing copula-based models, that hedging default risk is subject to substantial model risk.
In the following subsections, we study the dynamic of the jump-to-default ratio under each model setting. Figure 6 shows the jump-to-default ratio of the homogeneous Gaussian Copula model calibrated to 5-year iTraxx Europe IG data on 20 September 2006 where portfolio loss ranges from 0 to detachment points. Figure 7 shows the same function but with portfolio loss ranges from attachment points to detachment points 3 . Note that iTraxx IG series contains 125 entities. As the attachment points of iTraxx IG equal to {0%, 3%, 6%, 9%, 12%, 22%}, the corresponding values of N are approximately {0, 7, 13, 19, 25, 46}.
Homogeneous Gaussian Copula model
For any tranche [a, b], we find that the ratio decreases in time for any fixed L < a (when the portfolio loss has not hit the tranche). This time-decay effect can be explained by the fact that tranche losses are less likely to be incurred as time goes. On the other hand, the ratio tends to increase in time for fixed L ∈ [a, b] (when the portfolio loss starts hitting the tranche). This difference is caused by the fact that an additional default in the later case will not only change the likelihood of future defaults, but also incurred actual losses to the tranche. As time goes, likelihood of future defaults reduces, and the effect of the actual losses dominates in the valuation of the jump-to-default ratio.
Notice that the dynamic of the jump-to-default ratio is very similar across tranches. As we will see, it is not necessarily the case in other models.
Local intensity model Figure 8 shows the jump-to-default ratio of the local intensity model calibrated to 5-year iTraxx Europe IG data on 20 September 2006. We see that the ratio is very different from the one of the homogeneous Gaussian Copula model. In fact, its dynamic is closely related to the portfolio default intensity shown in Figure 2 . For example, we observe a sharp drop in the ratio at N = 25 for tranche [12%, 22%], which coincides with a sharp increase in the portfolio default intensity at the same point of N . Figure 9 shows the difference between the two jump-to-default ratios. Interestingly, we observe that the ratio of the local intensity model is larger than the one of the homogeneous Gaussian Copula model when L < a for any tranche [a, b] , and smaller when L ∈ [a, b]. Figure 10 shows the jump-to-default ratio of the Compound Poisson model calibrated to the same data as the homogeneous Gaussian Copula model and the local intensity model. At first glance, the dynamic of the ratio seems very similar to those of the homogeneous Gaussian Copula model. But if we look at the differences of the ratios between the two models in Figure 11 , we find that they are actually unlike. However, we are not able to identify regular patterns of the differences in the ratio as in the case of the local intensity model.
Bivariate spread-loss model Figure 12 and Figure 13 show the jump-to-default ratio of the bivariate spread-loss model at year 1 and year 4 respectively. We see that the dynamic of the ratio does not change significantly from year 1 to 4. At both times, we observe that the ratio monotonically decreases in Y for any fixed L ∈ [a, b] for any tranche [a, b] . This happens because when Y is large, the next-to-default probability becomes high. In this case, the effect on changes in mark-to-market values with respect to an additional default becomes small, which leads to a smaller hedge ratio.
To compare the bivariate spread-loss model to the homogeneous Gaussian Copula model, we plot the differences of their jump-to-default ratio in Figure 14 
Variance-minimizing strategy
After considering the strategies for hedging spread risk and default risk, one may wonder how we can hedge both sources of risk simultaneously. In practice, traders usually ignore the risk of default and only hedge the risk of changing in spreads. But as shown by the credit events in 2008 such as the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, defaults can have significant impacts on the credit portfolios as well. One solution to this problem is to consider a hedging strategy determined by some optimality criterion which take both spread risk and default risk into account. An example of this class of hedging strategies is the variance-minimizing strategy.
Definition 4. Let H be a square-integrable contingent claim at maturity T , and X be the discounted price process of the hedging instrument which is a square-integrable martingale under Q. We optimally choose the initial capital c and a self-financing trading strategy φ in X in order to minimize the quadratic hedging error:
min c,φ E Q c + T 0 φ t dX t − H 2 .
This strategy is referred to as the variance-minimizing strategy.
Föllmer and Sondermann [11] characterize this strategy in terms of Galtchouk-Kunita-Watanabe projection of the claim on the set of replicable payoffs (see Appendix for details). One nice property of the variance-minimizing strategy is that it coincides with the self-financing hedging strategy which replicates the contingent claim in a complete market. Furthermore, in many Markovian markets with jumps, the variance-minimizing hedge ratio can be explicitly computed [7, 20, 10] .
In the rest of this section, we will show the expression of the variance-minimizing hedge ratio for each model as well as their numerical values. Since homogeneous Gaussian Copula model using basecorrelation method does not provide a well-defined dynamic for the portfolio loss process, we will not consider it in this section. All proofs are presented in the Appendix.
Local intensity model
As shown by Laurent et al. [16] , the market is complete in the local intensity framework and the variance-minimizing hedge ratio is simply equal to the jump-to-default ratio.
. The variance-minimizing hedge ratio for tranche [a, b] at time t is equal to
.
Bivariate spread-loss model
Bivariate spread-loss model has portfolio default intensity driven by the number of defaults N and a diffusion process Y . Since we consider the underlying index default swap as the only hedging instrument, the market is incomplete. The variance-minimizing hedging strategy can be expressed as follow. 
Unlike the case of the local intensity model, the variance-minimizing hedge ratio for the bivariate spread-loss model does not only involves the jump-to-default values but also involves the partial derivatives of the mark-to-market values with respect to the additional risk factor Y . This reflects the fact that variance-minimization hedging is a strategy that takes both risk factors N and Y into accounting.
Compound Poisson model
In the Compound Poisson model, the portfolio loss process is driven by multiple independent Poisson processes with different parameters which also leads to an incomplete market. In this case, the varianceminimizing hedge ratio can be expressed as follow.
. The variance-minimizing hedge ratio of the Compound Poisson model for tranche [a, b] at time t is equal to
Notice that the variance-minimizing hedge ratio for Compound Poisson model does not only depend on the jump-to-default value with respect to one defaults but also with respect to multiple defaults. Together with Proposition 1 and 2, we realize that the variance-minimizing strategy depends on how we specify the portfolio loss dynamic. To see whether this dependence leads to exposure of model risk when hedging the CDO tranches, we compute the numerical values of the hedge ratios for each models which are shown in Figure 15 . From the figure, we see that the variance-minimizing hedge ratios are significantly different across models. This suggests that, similar to hedging of default risk, variance-minimization is subjected to substantial model risk.
We compare the spread-delta, jump-to-default ratio and variance-minimizing hedge ratio in Figure  16 . Unlike what was observed by Frey and Backhaus [10] , we find that the variance-minimizing hedge ratio does not necessarily provide an interpolation between the spread-delta and the jump-to-default ratio. For example, the variance-minimizing hedge ratio of the Compound Poisson model is substantially larger than both the spread-delta and the jump-to-default ratio for tranche [9%, 12/%], [12%, 22/%] and [22%, 100/%]. Note that since there were no defaults in the iTraxx series, we will study the impact of defaults on the index spreads using CDX North America indices at the end of this section. Figure 17 shows the iTraxx Europe IG spreads normalized by day one quotes in the sample periods. Observe that spreads were much volatile and tended to increase during the difficult market environment in 2007-2008. In each period, we enter protection seller's positions in a iTraxx CDO tranche on day 1. Our goal is to hedge each tranche positions with the underlying index default swap. On each day, we calibrate the models to the market data and compute the corresponding hedging positions in the index default swap. Then, we enter the desired positions in the index default swap according to the hedge ratios and invest (or borrow) the excess cash which is assumed to earn 5% per annum. The hedging strategies being considered are: Since the calibration of the Compound Poisson model requires intensive computation, it will not be considered in this empirical study. Figure 18 shows the scatter plots of the daily changes in the hedging portfolio values under deltahedging of spread risk against daily changes in the tranche values, in the first sample period. The dotted line is the 45-degree line and the solid line is the least square regression line. If perfect hedge is achieved, all points should lie on the 45-degree line. Therefore, we are looking for strategies which have points lie closely to the 45-degree line, or have regression slope coefficient close to one 4 . From the figure, we see that delta-hedging of spread risk appears to provide good hedges for all tranches except for the most senior tranche [22%, 100%] which is under-hedged. To summarize the results of the other strategies, we show the 95% confidence interval of the slope estimate for each strategy in Figure 19 . As we can see, delta-hedging of spread risk (Strategy 2) and variance-minimization under the bivariate spread-loss model (Strategy 6) appear to be the most effective strategies in a sense that they have Figure 20 shows the means and standard deviations of the daily P&L of the hedged positions. A good hedging strategy is expected to have average P&L close to zero (small bias) and small standard deviations (low volatility). Note that since we have assumed to hold protection seller's positions and the spreads decrease, the unhedged positions have positive returns in this period. In other words, if the average P&L is negative, the position is over-hedged. The P&Ls confirm our earlier observations that hedging of default risk based on jump-to-default ratio of the local intensity model (Strategy 3) and sensitivity-based hedging with respect to risk factor Y of the bivariate spread-loss model (Strategy 5) significantly over-hedge the mezzanine tranches [3%, 6%], [6%, 9%], [9%, 12%]. Moreover, their P&Ls appear to be much volatile than other strategies, which make them less preferable. On the other hand, hedging of default risk based on jump-to-default ratio of the homogeneous Gaussian Copula model and the bivariate spread-loss model (Strategy 1 and 4) lead to substantially larger loss in the equity tranche than delta-hedging of spread risk (Strategy 2) and variance-minimization (Strategy 6).
Before the storm: 20 September 2006 -8 March 2007
Overall, our results suggest that delta-hedging of spread risk (Strategy 2) and variance-minimization under the bivariate spread-loss model (Strategy 6) are the most effective strategies in this period. And hedging default risk based on jump-to-default ratio of any models performed poorly in this period. Figure 22 . As we can see, the hedging portfolio tracked the tranche [6%, 9%] nicely in the beginning of the period when the spread was relatively stable. However, when the spread became volatile in the middle of the period, the tranche value dropped more significantly than the hedging portfolio value. On some trading days, losses incurred in the tranche [6%, 9%] were twice as much as incurred in the hedging portfolio. At the end of the sample period, the hedging portfolio value seemed to converge back to the tranche [6%, 9%] value.
In fact, if we look at the 95% confidence intervals of the slope estimates in Figure 23 , all strategies appear to under-hedge the iTraxx tranches significantly. We believe that this shortcoming is due to the fact that these strategies are based on the hedging of small movements in the risk factors, while during the sample period, credit indices have been highly volatile as shown in Figure 17 . This suggest that a model which incorporates heavy tails or jumps in the daily spread movements might be more suited. Now, we turn to the P&L analysis which is summarized in Figure 24 . In this period, the P&L volatilities are quite similar across strategies, but sensitivity-based hedging with respect to risk factor Y of the bivariate spread-loss model (Strategy 5) and variance-minimization (Strategy 6) appear to have smaller bias than the other strategies in most cases. On the other hand, taking positions in index default swap according to jump-to-default ratio of the homogeneous Gaussian Copula model and the bivariate spread-loss model (Strategy 1 and 4) does not appear to be a good hedging strategy. It significantly over-hedges the equity tranche and leads to more substantial losses in non-equity tranches. Delta-hedging of spread risk (Strategy 2), which appears to be one of the most effective strategies in the first period, does not have the same level of performance. In particular, it leads to substantial losses in tranche [12%, 22%] and [22%, 100%]. 
Impact of defaults on CDS index spreads
In order to study the impact of defaults on the index spreads, we consider the 5-year CDX North America investment grade (CDX.NA.IG) and high yield (CDX.NA.HY) indices. In particular, we want to see how significant is the changing in spreads when defaults occur comparing to the daily spread volatilities. Up until 3 December 2008, there are four credit events in the CDX indices:
• Quebecor World Inc., announced on 21 January 2008 (Monday) before market closed Table 3 shows the spread returns on the credit event days or the first business day after the credit events 8 , normalized by the daily (unconditional) standard deviation of spread returns calculated using data from the inception of the series until 3 December 2008. Interestingly, we observe that spreads of the CDX indices decrease on the business day after Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac and Quebecor World Inc. credit events. This observation contradicts portfolio credit risk models, such as self-exciting models [9, 12, 13, 14] , which imply that spreads jump upwards when a credit event occurs in the underlying portfolio. Although CDX spreads do increase at the date of WaMu and Tembec credit events, the magnitudes of these changes are less than a daily standard deviation so they do not provide evidence of jumps in spreads at default.
On the other hand, we do observe jumps in the CDX spreads, but not necessarily on dates corresponding to constituent defaults. One example is on 15 9 ) which is a substantial upward move comparing to the daily spread volatility and can be attributed to a jump. This observation implies that having jumps in the index spreads is an important feature, but such jumps must not be tied to defaults in the underlying portfolio. Jumps can be caused by information external to the portfolio, such as bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in our example.
The absence of upward jumps in the spreads of CDX indices at the time of defaults in the reference portfolio is partly due to the fact that these events had been anticipated by the market: Figure 25 shows that the CDS spread of Fannie Mae had been increasing since the last quarter of 2007 and by the time it was bailed out by the U.S. government on 7 September 2008, the CDS spread was only half of the value in late February 2008. On the other hand, although CDS spread of Lehman Brothers had also been increasing since the end of 2007 (Figure 25 ), it had a very sharp jump on the day when it filed for bankruptcy, reflecting the fact that the market had not been expecting this credit event. 
Conclusion
We have presented a theoretical and empirical comparison of various hedging strategies for portfolio credit derivatives, with a detailed analysis of the hedging of index CDO tranches using index default swaps.
Comparison of various hedge ratios computed for different models calibrated to the same market data leads us to make several observations:
• Calibration to a common set of market data leads to similar (index) spread-deltas across models.
This shows that performance of strategies based on delta-hedging of spread risk is independent of the chosen model. In particular, there seems to be no point in using a sophisticated model if the hedging is simply based on spread-deltas.
• On the other hand, our numerical results reveal substantial differences in the jump-to-default ratios and variance-minimizing hedge ratios across models. In particular, jump-to-default ratios of the local intensity model and the bivariate spread-loss model appear to be smaller than the one of the homogeneous Gaussian Copula model for the equity tranche and larger for non-equity tranches. On the other hand, the situation for the Compound Poisson model is the opposite: the jump-to-default ratio of the Compound Poisson model is larger than for the homogeneous Gaussian Copula model for the equity tranche, and smaller for non-equity tranches. These results show, unlike what had been previously suggested in the literature by comparing copula-based models, that hedging strategies are subject to substantial model risk.
• As shown in Figure 16 and unlike what has been suggested in [10] , the variance-minimizing hedge ratio does not necessarily interpolate the jump-to-default ratio and index spread-delta: it can fall outside the interval defined by these two ratios.
In the second part of our study we have compared the performance these different hedging strategies for the hedging of various iTraxx CDO tranches with the underlying index default swaps in the 2006-2008 period. Our empirical analysis reveals several interesting features:
• Before the onset of the crisis, delta-hedging of spread risk and variance-minimization under a bivariate spread-loss model appear to be the most effective hedging strategies. Hedging strategies based on jump-to-default ratios performed poorly in this period.
• In the 2007-2008 period, variance-minimizing hedges led to significantly smaller losses in the senior tranches [12%, 22%] and [22%, 100%] than strategies based on delta-hedging of spread risk during the subprime crisis.
• However, all hedging strategies considered underestimated the movements in the tranches during the 2007-2008 period. We believe that this shortcoming is due to the fact that these strategies are based on the hedging of small moves in the underlying, while during the recent period credit indices have been highly volatile and exhibited large daily moves in spreads. This suggests that a model which incorporates heavy tails / jumps in daily spread movements might be more suited.
• A study of CDX North American Investment Grade and High Yield indices reveals that, interestingly, index spreads did not appear to have upward jumps at the default dates of index constituents. This absence of significant jumps in index spreads at constituent default dates goes against models where jumps occur in spread but only at default dates, such as self-exciting processes [13] . It suggests that, while jumps do occur in spreads, they can arise from unexpected events not necessarily related to default inside the portfolio.
Dynamic of G [a,b] can be derived by the same steps. Finally, we solve (10) Since we assumed constant interest rate, the discount factors cancel out and we can replaceṽ by v.
B.3 Proof of Proposition 3
Following the same steps as in the last proof, it can be shown that the dynamic of G index follows Since we assumed constant interest rate, the discount factors cancel out and we can replaceṽ by v.
